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Takakazu YAMAGISHI1
　 Even after Japan achieved a universal health insurance in 1961, the health care reform 
continued to cause heated political debate in Japanese politics.  Among many political 
stakeholders, the Japan Medical Association has been seen playing a large role in shaping the 
path of health care policy.  In particular, Takemi Taro, who served as the JMA’s president for 
twenty-six years from 1957 to 1982, contributed in making the health care debate more visible.
　 Media and commentaries have given much attention to the JMA and its role in Japanese 
politics.  While many of them are written on how the JMA plays role in specific events, or 
legislation, or how politics of the JMA presidential election took place, social science scholars 
have produced only limited studies which focus mainly on the JMA.  William Steslicke is 
one of the major social scientists who produced a book specifically on the JMA in 1973.  He 
demonstrated how powerful the JMA was in Japanese politics, but he was not able to do much 
to see the historical development of the JMA.2
　 This paper is to understand what has driven the development of the JMA since the Meiji 
Restoration and complement what Steslicke and others have studied about the JMA.  It first 
describes how the government’s health policy affected the formation and development of 
the JMA.  Second, it illustrates the JMA’s organizational structure and sees how the internal 
politics took place.  Third, it shows the historical transformation of the JMA presidents.  Lastly, 
it explains how the JMA’s membership has changed and then discusses how it has affected the 
development of the JMA.
　 This paper is part of a larger project that studies on how health policy and its politics have 
evolved in Japan and emphasizes special attention to the relationship between the government 
and the JMA.  This paper makes a contribution by looking into how the JMA’s internal politics 
has taken place historically.
1　The research was supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (00454405), Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the Pache Research 
Subsidy I―A―2 for Academic Year 2014, Nanzan University.
2　William E. Steslicke, Doctors in Politics: The Political Life of the Japan Medical Association (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1973).
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1. The Government Policy and the Development of the JMA
　 Medical associations are believed to make medicine more professional and scientific.  And 
stabilizing doctors’ finance is very important for them to increase membership.3  The American 
Medical Association was established in 1847 to improve medical education and professionalize 
medicine.4  The founding fathers of the JMA had similar motive but it turned out to be in a 
different position with the central government from its American counterpart.  This section 
overviews the history of the JMA until it was reorganized after World War II to adopt the basis 
of the current organizational structure.
　 One of the unique aspects in the formation of medical associations in Japan was that they 
were created to reduce the power of the Japanese traditional medicine, known as Kanpō, which 
had been authorized as the state medicine under the Tokugawa Shogunate.  The first national 
medical association was formed as a result of the competition between the traditional medicine 
and the western medicine which the new Meiji government made serious efforts to promote. 
Whether western-style doctors liked it or not, the formation and development of medical 
associations in Japan were enmeshed in the government’s health care policy.
　 When the Meiji government began its policy to westernize the Japanese society, economy 
and politics, health care policy became part of it.  Kanpō was perceived as inefficient medicine 
to treat patients.  Particularly, Kanpō did not work for those who needed surgical procedures 
like wounded soldiers.5  Moreover, because there was not an integrated medical educational 
system in the era of the Tokugawa Shogunate, many doctors had begun to practice after only a 
brief apprenticeship.
　 The Tokyo Medical Society was born in 1886 as the first genuine doctors’ association.  The 
creation of local medical associations spread to whole Japan.  Although it initially included 
Kanpō doctors, the Society soon began to push the government to produce legislation for 
doctors, particularly private practitioners, who practiced western medicine.6  The creation of 
local medical association resulted into a movement that formed the national association.7  In 
1906, the Great Japan Medical Association was founded.  It was created for private practitioners, 
excluding those who were employed by public hospitals.
　 In 1923, the Great Japan Medical Association pressed the government to give it a legal 
status.  For the government, the legalization of the national association would be useful to 
3　Carol S. Weissert and William G. Wissert, Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 139.
4　Martin Kaufman, American Medical Education. The Formative Years, 1765―1910 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1941), 127―30.
5　Kawakami Takeshi, Gendai Nihon Iryōshi [History of Modern Japanese Health] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1965), 91.
6　Hidehiko Kasahara, Nihon no iryō gyōsei: Sono Rekishi to Kadai [Health Care Administration of Japan: Its History and 
Problems] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 1999), 81; Akira Sugaya, Nihon Iryō Seidoshi [History of Japanese Medical 
Policy] (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1976), 243―44.
7　Kawakami, Gendai Nihon Iryōshi, 242.
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implement the Health Insurance Law that was passed in the Imperial Diet in 1922.  For elite 
doctors in the JMA, it would help them increase the membership and gain the power over 
local medical associations and individual members.  The JMA cooperated in the policy-making 
process of the HI and had power to decide on doctors’ fees.  While the government had a 
powerful tool to implement the new legislation, the JMA elites gained a venue to influence the 
government and control doctors’ finance by dealing with the HI.  But in the meantime, the 
government earned a leverage to influence the JMA.8
　 Through the venue which tied the government and the JMA, WWII gave more power to 
the government against the JMA.  The JMA was absorbed into the Japanese government’s 
activities to conduct the war.  The JMA elites began to cooperate with the government by 
proposing a drastic reorganization.  In January 1943, the JMA was reorganized to be a state 
organization.9  As the war deepened, the government began to take control over doctors’ fees 
by giving the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) the authority to make decision on fees of 
specific procedures and drugs.
　 The US-led occupation began after the war ended in August 1945.  As par t of its 
demilitarization and democratization policy, the occupation authority ordered that the JMA be 
dissolved and reorganized as a voluntary organization.  However, in its reorganization process 
and under the occupation, the JMA faced a deadlock and could not take the power of setting the 
fees back from the government.10  On the other hand, GHQ’s postwar purge of public officers 
did not impact much the MHW.  GHQ actually used the MHW’s strong bureaucratic power to 
help Japan recover from the wartime devastation and reformed the health insurance system.11
　 In sum, from 1900s to 1940s, the JMA was born and got involved in the government’s health 
insurance administration.  The JMA had a similar motivation to its American counterpart.  But 
because the Meiji government took a strong leadership in the westernization of medicine, the 
JMA played lesser role in reforming the medical education and it emphasized more on the 
financial aspect.  Soon, the JMA was absorbed in the war mobilization policy and became state 
entity.  Then, with its reorganization, the JMA was reorganized to be a voluntary association. 
As the JMA developed, the JMA elites consistently sought to centralize the power structure. 
They had to do so to compete with Kanpō doctors and improve the economic status of 
members.  By dealing with the HI, they had a venue to influence the government, but at the 
same time, they were enmeshed in the government’s health care policy.  When WWII was 
advanced, through the venue, it was easier for the Japanese government to absorb the JMA into 
the totalitarian regime.  Although the JMA was reorganized again into a voluntary organization 
after the war, its power structure did not change much.  This is a clear contrast with the AMA, 
which grew slowly without much of the central government’s intervention and blocked the 
government’s efforts to introduce a universal health insurance system in the 1930s and during 
8　Taku Nomura, Nihon Ishikai [The Japan Medical Association] (Tokyo: Chikusa Shobō, 1976), 34.
9　Ibid., 46―47.
10　Ibid., 56.
11　For the health care reform, see Adam D. Sheingate and Takakazu Yamagishi, “Occupation Politics: American Interests 
and the Struggle over Health Insurance in Postwar Japan,” Social Science History 30 no. 1 (Spring 2006): 137―64.
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WWII.
2. Organizational Structure
　 The current organizational structure of the JMA is based on one it adopted in its 
reorganization after the war.  In the process of making JMA’s policy proposal, the House of 
Delegates takes the role of the decision-making body.  As Chart 1 shows, the Board of Trustees 
and the Executive Board of Trustees, which mainly make policy proposals to the House of 
Delegates, are positioned under the House of Delegates.  The Board of Trustees is composed 
of one president, vice presidents, board members, and executive board members.  It also has 
many committees under the direction of board members and executive board members.
Chart 1　Organizational Chart of Japan Medical Association
Source: The Japan Medical Association, “Organization Chart of Japan Medical Association,” 
http://www.med.or.jp/english/about_JMA/organization.html, accessed on April 24, 
2015.
　 Among the many actors in the JMA, the most powerful person is the president.  The JMA 
president has more power over the other actors within it than its American counterpart.  Hajime 
Mizuno describes about the inter-politics of the JMA, “The president has a dominant power. 
In other words, the president can control the JMA’s policy and have dominant administrative 
power. . . .  If official positions are to be divided, one category is the president and the other 
category is others.”12  The president is in the position to control the agenda the JMA deals with.
　 In terms of the JMA’s relationship with prefectural and local medical associations, it has a 
12　Hajime Mizuno, Dare mo Kakanakatta Nihonishikai [The Untold Story of the Japan Medical Association] (Tokyo: 
Sōshisha, 2003), 17.
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large power base.  Steslicke wrote in 1973, “Within the Association the level of interest and 
participation on the part of rank-and-file members tends to be fairly low.  This means that a 
small, active minority of members, most of whom hold an elective or appointive office, are able 
to exercise considerable control over the management of the Association’s affairs and activities. 
It also means that this active minority is able to mobilize the relatively inactive majority at 
special times and for special purposes.13”  This has not changed very much since then.  This 
can be contrasted with the AMA that is based on more decentralized organizational structure 
and that local associations get involved more actively in the state-level health care policy-
making process.
　 In sum, although there are many organizations and actors in the JMA, it has a large power 
against the prefectural and local associations.  Among the JMA officials, the president cast a 
dominant power.  This is largely related to the JMA’s history to centralize its power structure 
as it developed.
3. Presidents
　 The president has a large authority in the JMA’s decision-making process.  This section 
reviews the characteristics of the successive presidents and then picked up two presidents who 
had significant influence on the JMA’s history.  The history of the presidents demonstrates that 
the nature of the JMA leadership historically changed from more university-centered to private 
practitioner-centered.
　 Table 1 is the list of the JMA presidents in which some characteristic changes can be 
seen.  First, as seen in their home medical association, most of them belonged to the Tokyo 
Medical Association.  It shows that the Tokyo Medical Association has had leadership in the 
JMA.  However, this trend changed recently; only one of the recent five presidents is from 
the Tokyo Medical Association.  Second, the first nine presidents (Tamiya was the president 
twice in separate terms) experienced professorship at the university or college, and Kitazato 
Shibasaburo, Kitajima Taichi, Tamiya Takeo served as dean of medical school.  In contrast, 
among the last eleven presidents, only one, Haranaka Katsuyuki, experienced professorship. 
All of them, including Haranaka, served as head of hospital and clinic.  Third, four out of 
the last nine presidents once served as vice president, while two in the first ten presidents 
experienced it.
　 The contrast between the first nine presidents and last ten presidents demonstrates that 
before the end of the post-WWII reconstruction era, experiencing professorship was more 
an important factor to cast a large influence on the JMA than after that.  In the latter period, 
however, serving as head of hospital or clinic and getting higher positions within the JMA 
became more important to become the president.  It can be concluded that in the latter period, 
one has to have a better political skills to be on the top of the JMA than in the former period. 
Two presidents, who cast a large influence, reflect this characteristic change.
13　Steslicke, Doctors in Politics, 67.
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Name Home Medical Association Previous Careers Term 
1 Kitazato Shibasaburo Tokyo Medical Association
Dean of Keio University Medical 
School, Head of Kitazato Instutute
1916―1931
2 Kitajima Taichi Tokyo Medical Association




N/A (appointed by the 
government)
Professor of Kyushu Imperial 
University and Tokyo Imperial 
University
1943―1946
4 Nakayama Toshihiko Tokyo Medical Association
President of Tokyo Medical 
Association, Member of House of 
Peers
1946―1948
5 Takahashi Akira Tokyo Medical Association
Professor of Tokyo Imperial University 
Medical School
1948―1950
6 Tamiya Takeo Tokyo Medical Association






President of Kumamoto Medical 
Association, Professor of Kumamoto 
Medical College, Member of House of 
Councilors
1950―1952
8 Tamiya Takeo Tokyo Medical Association
Dean of Tokyo Imperial University 
Medical School
1952―1954
9 Kurosawa Junzo Tokyo Medical Association
President of Tokyo Medical 
Association, Professor of Nippon 
Medical School, Head of Ogawa 
Ophthalmology Clinic
1954―1955
10 Obata Korekiyo Tokyo Medical Association
President of Tokyo Medical 
Association, Head of Hamada Hospital
1955―1957
11 Takemi Taro Tokyo Medical Association
Vice President of the JMA, Head of 
Takemi Clinic
1957―1982
12 Hanaoka Kenji Nagano Medical Association
President of Nagano Medical 
Association, Head of Jikei Yoshida 
Hospital
1982―1984
13 Haneda Haruto Tokyo Medical Association
President of Tokyo Medical 
Association, Head of Haneda Clinic
1984―1992
14 Murase Toshio Tokyo Medical Association






Vice President of the JMA, Head of 
Tsuboi Hospital
1996―2004
Table 1　Presidents of the Japanese Medical Association
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　 Among the JMA presidents, Kitazato Shibasaburo, the first president, should be the 
most important person for the JMA.  The JMA would have not been formed in the way it 
did without him.  He studied in Germany under the guidance of Robert Koch and became a 
world-famous researcher.  He came back from Germany in 1892 and became the head of the 
Institute of Infectious Diseases that was a private organization created with financial support 
from Fukuzawa Yukichi and Moriyama Ichizaemon.  Kitazato fought against the government’s 
intervention in turning the Institute into a national institution.  Although it was eventually 
nationalized, Kitazato resigned with other staff members and founded the Kitazato Institute. 
He also played a great role in establishing the medical school of Keio University, a private 
university created by Fukuzawa.  He believed in a practical branch of learning and had distant 
himself from the government.14
　 The second important president is Takemi Taro.  Unlike many of his predecessors, before 
he became the president in 1957, he did not serve professorship.  After he dropped out from 
research assistantship at Keio University, he worked at Rikagaku Kenkyūsho (Riken) which 
was established in 1917 as the first large-scale national science research institute.  After that 
he became a solo-practitioner in Ginza.  Through his personal connection owing to Riken, 
he began an active networking.  He had a direct access to the center of politics through his 
marriage to the grandchild of Makino Nobuaki, son of Okubo Toshimichi and Lord Keeper 
of the Privy Seal.  Through the marriage, Takemi also became a very close kin to Yoshida 
Shigeru who served as the Prime Minister for about seven years after the war.  With his strong 
connection in politics, Takemi was asked to serve as vice president under Tamiya Takeo twice. 
After he became the president in 1957, Takemi fought against the government to ask for the 
14　Ogawa Teizo, Igaku no Rekishi [History of Medicine] (Tokyo, Chuokoronsha, 1964), 199. Also see, The Kitasato 
Institute, “Kitasato Shibasaburo,” http://www.kitasato.ac.jp/kinen-shitsu/about/index.html, accessed on September 
30, 2014.
Name Home Medical Association Previous Careers Term 
16 Uematsu Haruo Osaka Medical Association
President of Osaka Medical 
Association, Head of Muramatsu 
Clinic
2004―2006
17 Karasawa Yoshihito Tokyo Medical Association
President of Tokyo Medical 
Association, Head of karamatsu Clinic
2006―2010
18 Haranaka Katsuyuki Ibaraki Medical Association
President of Ibaraki Medical 
Association, Associate Professor of 
Tokyo University Medical School, 
Head of Kyojin Oohata Hospital 
2010―2012
19 Yokokura Yoshitake Fukuoka Medical Association
Vice President of the JMA, President 
of Fukuoka Medical Association, Head 
of Koei Yokokura Hospital
2012―
Source: The Japan Medical Association, “Journal of the Japan Medical Association,” Japan Knowledge, www.
japanknowledge.com.
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freedom of doctors and increase of doctors’ fees.  He became well-known as “Kenka Taro” 
after his aggressive strategies, including his refusal to accept patients with health insurance 
programs.  He served as the president much longer than the others for twenty-six years.15
　 In sum, the president has a dominant power in the JMA; however, the necessary conditions 
to be the president have changed.  The Takemi’s presidency seems to be a turning point in this 
transformation.  After him, to be on the top of the JMA it became more important for one to 
have political skills to climb up the ladder within the JMA rather than being a professor or dean 
in medical schools.  This transformation means that the JMA became, or at least began to be 
seen, more of the association of private practitioners, for private practitioners, and by private 
practitioners after the Takemi presidency.
4. Membership
　 Interest groups cannot exist without their membership.  To maintain its membership, as 
Mancur Olson points out, interest groups must provide selective benefits which one can get 
only by becoming a member.16  However, it is difficult for medical associations to provide 
selective benefits to their members.  What they mainly seek is the development of medicine, 
professionalization of health care workers, and the financial stability of doctors.  All of them 
cannot be purely selective benefits for medical association members because non-members can 
receive them as well.
　 The JMA has suffered from the decline of membership.  As Figure 1 shows, in 1947, 75.1% 
of doctors were JMA members, but the rate dropped to 68% in 1953.  It got back to 74.5% in 
1967, but the JMA faced gradual decline of membership after that and the rate was 57.7% in 
2008.  This decline reflects the decreasing trend of solo-practitioners on which the JMA rely 
its membership.  As Figure 2 shows, solo-practitioners occupied 61% of all doctors.  But the 
number declined to 40% in 1981 and 26% in 2008.
　 The transformation of its membership has given the JMA presidents harder time to take 
leadership in policy-making process of health care reform.  The decline of members means 
that the JMA loses its financial and political power in election and the policy-making process. 
To increase the number of members, moreover, they have to reach doctor who are employed 
by hospitals.  A symbolic way would be that the JMA makes an effort to raise the national 
health insurance fees for hospitals.  However, it is very difficult for the JMA leaders to do it 
because, particularly in the recent fiscal austerity, benefiting hospitals results in hurting solo-
practitioners.  In fact, the percentage of the JMA members who are employed by hospitals has 
not increased, around twenty-five percent since 1955.17  The JMA has got into a very difficult 
15　Shuichi Hido, “Itansha Takemi Taro [A Heretic Takemi Taro],” Chuokoron 79 no. 7 (July 1964); 246―258; Takakazu 
Yamagishi, “A Short Biography of Takemi Taro, the President of the Japan Medical Association,” Journal of the Nanzan 
Academic Society Social Sciences 1 (January 2011): 49―56.
16　Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).




　 This paper demonstrates how JMA’s internal politics took place by looking at its formation 
Figure 1　The JMA Membership (% of All Doctors) 
Source: The Japan Medical Association
Figure 2　The Number of Solo-Practitioners (% of All Doctors)
Source: Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, “Ishi, Shikaishi, Yakuzaishi Chosa 
[Statistics of Doctors, Dentists, Pharmacists],” http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.
do?lid=000001060599, accessed on February 2, 2015.
138 The Japan Medical Association and its Political Development
and development, its organizational and political structure, and its membership.  The way 
the JMA was established largely affected its subsequent development especially its power 
relationship with the government and its internal power structure.
　 With the powerful new Meiji government that took the leadership to westernize Japanese 
medicine, western-style doctors earned their legitimacy to form medical association to push for 
further westernization.  After the government created the Health Insurance Law of 1922, the 
government saw the newly legalized JMA as a tool to implementing the law.  WWII made the 
JMA a means for the government to make healthier soldiers and workers to win the war.  After 
the war, the big “loser” in the health care policy-making process was the JMA.  It was blamed 
for its wartime cooperation with the government.  However, the MHW was almost intact during 
GHQ’s public official purge and maintained its strong authority to reform the health care policy. 
It was after Takemi became its president, the JMA began to be seen as a full-fledged interest 
group.
　 The JMA’s organizational structure had been consistently centralized.  Kitazato played 
a dominant role in the formative period of the JMA.  It could be attributed partly to his 
personality; however, it was largely because the JMA needed to deal with the strong central 
government.  The JMA’s internal power structure remained centralized even after the 
reorganization process during the US -led occupation.  The Takemi’s presidency tried to take 
stronger leadership to make the JMA politically stronger.  But the membership began to 
decline and it has given instability to the JMA and made it harder to impact the debate of health 
care reform.
　 This paper is intended to contribute to the study which investigates on how the health policy 
has developed in Japan and how it affected the JMA.  The first thing to advance this paper is to 
see more carefully how institutional and policy changes by the government affected the JMA. 
The second is to understand how the JMA interacted with other stakeholders in health care, 
such as nurses association, hospital associations, and pharmaceutical associations affected one 
another.  The last is to analyze how internal politics has taken place after Takemi resigned in 
1983.
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Abstract
　 Although the JMA played a significant role in the history of health insurance policy in Japan, 
social scientists have produced only limited to study its historical development.  This paper is 
to understand what has driven the development of the JMA since the Meiji Restoration and 
complement what the major existing works by William Steslicke and others.  This paper is part 
of a larger project that studies on how health policy and its politics have evolved in Japan and 
emphasizes special attention to the relationship between the government and the JMA by looking 
into how the JMA’s internal politics has taken place historically.
